

CODE OF PRACTICE

Rail Safety Investigation



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RISSB wishes to acknowledge the positive contribution of subject matter experts in the development of this Standard. Their efforts ranged from membership of the Development Group through to individuals providing comments on a draft of the Standard during the open review.

I commend this Code of Practice to the Australasian rail industry as it represents industry good practice and has been developed through a rigorous process.

Damien White

Chief Executive Officer

Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board

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Approval

Approvai	
Name	Date
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Objective

This Rail Safety Investigation Code of Practice has been produced to define industry good practice for anyone in the Australian rail industry who is involved in, or likely to be involved in, the investigation of rail safety occurrences. It also provides guidance in the application of the Code and a suite of tools to assist investigators.

The aim of the Code is to establish a methodical approach to the collection and analysis of investigation data so that system improvements necessary to prevent or reduce the likelihood of recurrence can be identified and implemented.

The Code provides a simple, standard method of investigation and builds on the best practices already used by various organizations in the industry whilst promoting a just culture approach for all investigations.



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Section 1 Introduction

1.1 Preface

This Code of Practice (CoP) acknowledges a range of investigation models or frameworks that could be adopted to investigate occurrences within the rail industry.

The investigation methodology contained within this Code establishes the minimum rail safety investigation practices. Other frameworks may be used, provided they meet the intent of the principles outlined in this Code.

This Code provides the basis of a common approach to investigation of occurrences for the Australian rail industry that accommodates individually tailored, systemic investigation methods that rail transport operators (RTOs) may use.

Throughout this document, the term occurrence will refer to safety incidents that are notifiable under Rail Safety National Law (RSNL) or any other investigation that an RTO undertakes to determine any contributing factors and identify safety risk mitigations and preventative actions.

1.2 Scope

This Code provides procedures, tools and examples to assist rail transport operators (RTOs), organisations, and anyone responsible for conducting a rail safety investigation. This Code is not intended to be used for investigations of a disciplinary and regulatory prosecution.

Specifically, this Code is designed to help:

- (a) compliance with the intent of the provisions and principles of the Safety Management System and prevailing rail safety standards;
- (b) response in a structured, systematic and consistent manner to rail safety occurrences;
- (c) identification of all contributing factors to the incident and development of safety actions to address these contributing factors;
- (d) identification of any and all factors contributing to the incident, and the development of safety actions to address those contributing factors; and
- (e) systemic contributors to the occurrences using investigative tools and methods.

This Code is primarily designed for the investigation of rail safety occurrences. However, the principles and practices are equally applicable to any other investigations as deemed appropriate by the RTO.

1.3 Referenced documents

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document:

- ONRSR Investigation Reports by Rail Transport Operators Guideline
- ONRSR Notifiable Occurrence Reporting Requirements Guideline